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Rebecca Aldworth and Stephen Harris
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CHAPTER
ike efforts to end the commer-
cial hunting of whales, the cam-
paign to stop the slaughter
of seals in Canada has become a
major focus for animal and envi-
ronment protection groups and
governments the world over. For
decades the face of the harp seal
pup has been a symbol—to many,
the symbol—of environment and
animal advocacy. 
But as much as the campaign to
save the seals has become an icon
for those who would protect
wildlife, the campaign to continue
the hunt has become a focus for
tho se  who  wo u ld  b l o ck  t he
progress of the animal protection
and environmental movements. 
There is little middle ground
between the two camps, with one
calling for an immediate cessation
of all commercial hunting of seals
in Canada and the other lobbying
for the highest seal hunt quotas in
history. Canadian journalists often
report with incredulity the vast
gulf between the two sides of this
debate. At the same time, those
working to end the seal hunt note
the campaign appears far harder
to win than the economic and cul-
tural importance of the industry
would seem to warrant. 
A review of the history of the seal
campaign and the political envi-
ronment in which it occurred can
help account for some of these per-
ceptions. It exposes the forces be-
hind the rejuvenation of commer-
cial sealing over the past decade
and reveals that the price on the
seals’ heads is far greater than that
which could ever be attached to
their skins. Moreover, it explains
why the success—or failure—of
the campaign to save the seals may
play a significant role in shaping




Commercial hunting of seals and
other pinniped populations has
taken place off Canada’s east coast
for hundreds of years. From its very
beginnings, this commercial ex-
ploitation was conducted in an
entirely unregulated and unsus-
tainable fashion, leading to the ex-
tirpation and severe depletion of
several populations (Mowat 1984). 
The overhunting of pinnipeds did
not occur in isolation; the marine
environment of the northwestern
Atlantic has been systematically
devastated by relentless commer-
cial exploitation from the time of
the first European settlers through
today. In addition to pinnipeds, sev-
eral species of whales, marine birds,
and fish have also been driven to
the brink of extinction through
commercial slaughter over the past
four centuries. Pilot whales, once
the most common inshore whale
species in Newfoundland, were
killed en masse, in part to provide
meat for mink and fox fur farms,
until the population had become so
depleted that hunters could no
longer find enough to meet de-
mand (Sanger, Dickinson, and
Handcock 1998). The bowhead and
right whales have become endan-
gered species, the grey whale popu-
lation of the North Atlantic no
longer exists, and both the hump-
back and blue whale are now
threatened species. Great auks,
flightless aquatic birds once found
throughout the North Atlantic,
were hunted for their feathers, oil,
and meat, and their populations
began to decline rapidly in the late
1600s. Funk Island, off Newfound-
land’s east coast, and the Magdalen
Islands in the Gulf of St. Lawrence
were once home to large colonies,
but Funk Island’s last bird was
killed between 1785 and 1800, and
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extinct in 1844 (Mersereau 2000).
Industrial fishing has severely
depleted numerous ground fish
stocks, including northern cod,
haddock, redfish, American plaice,
and capelin. 
Early European settlers’ first
foray into commercial hunting
of pinnipeds off the east coast of
Canada was with the walrus.
Throughout the sixteenth and sev-
enteenth centuries, walruses were
slaughtered relentlessly for their
lucrative oil, leather, and tusks.
By 1680 all walruses had been re-
moved from the St. Lawrence River;
those along the north shore of the
Gulf of St. Lawrence were gone by
1704 (Lavigne and Kovacs 1988).
As the walrus disappeared, grey
seals quickly became a substitute
source for marine oil. For a time,
grey seals became one of the most
exploited resources in the New
World. As with the walruses, they
were slaughtered by the thou-
sands, and by the 1860s grey seals
had been wiped out of much of
their former range (Ronald and
Lavigne n.d.). 
With walruses and grey seal pop-
ulations in severe declines, it was
inevitable that hunters would soon
set their sights on the larger popu-
lations of ice-breeding harp and
hooded seals. These seals spent
only part of the year in Canadian
waters, breeding on inaccessible
sea ice, and it is likely they initially
escaped the attention of early
hunters. But by the early eigh-
teenth century, both French and
English settlers had begun to hunt
harp and hooded seals commer-
cially; by the end of the century,
British settlers in Newfoundland
were killing more than a hundred
thousand seals in some years (Lav-
igne and Kovacs 1988). 
Over the next hundred years,
advances in technology and vessel
construction dramatically increased
the number of seals killed in the
annual hunt. The year 1818 marks
the beginning of the so-called
Golden Age of Sealing, nearly half
a century of historic high levels of
killing. Between 1818 and 1862,
Newfoundlanders killed more than
eighteen million seals. 
Annual catches of harp seals re-
mained strong until the 1860s,
when they finally began to decline as
the unsustainable levels of hunting
took their toll on the population.
Despite technological advances such
as steam-driven vessels and the use
of aircraft to spot seal herds, kill lev-
els would never again be as consis-
tently high. Nonetheless, sealers
continued to slaughter hundreds of
thousands of seals annually, and by
the turn of the century, another
12.8 million seals had been killed.
This brought the total seal kill for
the century to a staggering 33 mil-
lion animals, most of them newborn
harp seals (Ronald and Lavigne n.d.). 
With the dawn of the twentieth
century came the advent of steel-
hulled ships, and annual catches
averaged more than 200,000 per
year until 1914. But the new ships
were called into service during
both world wars, and kill levels dur-
ing these years dropped dramati-
cally (Canadian Geographic 2000).
Hunt numbers began to increase
again at the end of World War II,
with higher oil prices and the intro-
duction of motorized vessels. 
On average, more than 200,000
seals were killed annually through
1949. That year the sealing indus-
try began to restructure. New-
foundland became a province of
Canada, and with that came social
benefits that made sealing less nec-
essary for economic survival (Cana-
dian Broadcasting Company [CBC]
1958). As sealing firms in New-
foundland withdrew from the seal
hunt, companies based in Norway
sent their boats to the ice instead.
Despite the decrease in Newfound-
land interest in the seal hunt, kill
levels increased, achieving a 1950s
average of 312,000 seals per year
(Lavigne and Kovacs 1988).  
Scientists soon grew concerned
about the high levels of killing. In
1960 D. Sergeant warned, 
Under these conditions, and
without imposition of effective
controls, the stock of western
Atlantic harp seals must be
considered to be in grave dan-
ger of catastrophic decline in
numbers within a very few
years. (In Lavigne and Kovacs
1988, 131) 
Sergeant and Fisher (1960)
noted that the census figures indi-
cated the population had been re-
duced by at least 50 percent
between 1950 and 1960.  
The Campaign 
to Save the Seals 
The question the seal hunt posed was
not just how seals were killed, but
whether they should be killed at all.
—Brian Davies, founder, 
International Fund 
for Animal Welfare
As scientists grew increasingly con-
cerned about unsustainable kill
levels, Canadians were beginning
to consider the animal welfare im-
plications of the seal hunt. Hu-
mane societies first sent observers
to the seal hunt during the 1950s,
and reports of cruelty slowly fil-
tered out to the public. In 1958
Albert Perlin, editor of Newfound-
land’s Daily News, was interviewed
by CBC radio about the sealing
industry. He commented,
The seal fishery was a wasteful
industry. It was in many ways
an unpleasant industry. I’ve
heard many a sealer talk about
the small whitecoats—two or
three days old—almost look-
ing up with tears in their eyes
as they ki l led them.. .and
frankly, if it’s an industry we
could do without, I’m not at all
sure—from the standpoint of
humanitarianism alone—it’s
probably a good industry to be
without. (CBC 1958) 
In 1964 the seal hunt achieved
widespread notoriety, when a film in-
cluding seal hunt footage was com-
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missioned and broadcast by Radio
Canada (the French component of
the CBC). For the first time, the
stark images of the bloodied new-
born pups on the white ice floes and
scenes of seals appearing to be
skinned alive allowed Canadians to
see what they had occasionally read
about in newspapers. The images
were disturbing, and public reaction
was understandably strong. 
In 1966 the New Brunswick Soci-
ety for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals sent its officer, B. Davies,
to observe the commercial seal
hunt. Davies was profoundly moved
by what he witnessed, and founded
the International Fund for Animal
Welfare (IFAW) just three years
later, with the goal of ending
Canada’s commercial seal hunt
(Lavigne and Kovacs 1988). Im-
pressed by its ability to generate
media coverage, Davies also sought
to involve the newly formed organ-
ization Greenpeace in the cam-
paign to save seals. Over the com-
ing years, innovative media events
on the ice organized by IFAW,
Greenpeace, and others, and the
support of celebrities such as
Brigitte Bardot, made the plight of
the seal pups in Canada an interna-
tional lead story. As the public out-
cry against the seal hunt echoed
around the world, it was clear the
global effort to save the seals had
begun in earnest. 
The messaging of the animal wel-
fare groups working to stop the seal
hunt largely focused on the objec-
tions to beating newborn pups to
death in front of their mothers,
along with observer testimony and
veterinary evidence indicating a
significant percentage of the pups
were being skinned alive in the
process (Simpson 1967; Jordan
1978). Images of newborn seals
staring up at club-wielding sealers
shocked people around the world,
and, as the campaign progressed,
the debate was changing from how
many seals should be killed in the
hunt to whether it was morally
acceptable to kill them at all. 
As the cruelty debate raged on,
government scientists were continu-
ing to warn that the consistently
high kill levels threatened the very
survival of the seal populations. In
1971 a quota system was introduced
in an attempt to conserve the rap-
idly dwindling seal stocks. However,
the situation continued to worsen,
and by 1975 a senior Canadian gov-
ernment scientist was so concerned
about the impact of high levels of
hunting that he suggested the harp
seal population could be lost in the
absence of a ten-year moratorium
on commercial sealing (Lavigne and
Kovacs 1988). 
With Canada showing little will
to even reduce quotas to a more
sustainable level—much less end
the hunt for humanitarian rea-
sons—Davies and his colleagues
realized public opposition would
not be enough to stop the seal
hunt. At the time, Europe was
Canada’s top sealskin market, im-
porting fully three-quarters of the
skins produced each year. Davies
argued that Canada’s commercial
seal hunt was in reality Europe’s
responsibility, given that Europe
was providing the economic incen-
tive for the seal hunt to continue. 
A tremendous lobby effort was
waged by IFAW and European ani-
mal protection groups. An impres-
sive five million signatures oppos-
ing the seal hunt were collected
and submitted to the European
Parliament and British govern-
ment. By 1982 the public pressure
was overwhelming, and the Euro-
pean Parliament voted to ban the
import of skins from “whitecoats”
(newborn harp seal pups under
about two weeks of age) and “blue-
backs” (hooded seal pups under
about one year of age). The meas-
ure passed, 160 to 10, with 20 ab-
stentions, and the issue then went
to the European Commission for
consideration. In October 1982
the commission recommended a
temporary import ban based on a
clause in the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) per-
mitting trade restrictions to pro-
tect public morals. One month
later the European Parliament
effected a temporary ban to last
until March 1983. Just before it
expired, the European Economic
Community (EEC), predecessor of
the European Union, extended it
for another six months. Talks on
ending the ban took place among
Canada, Norway, and the European
Commission, but on October 1,
1983, the EEC implemented a two-
year ban, then renewed it for
another four years in 1985. Since
Europe was the primary market for
the Canadian sealing industry, kill
levels in Canada declined dramati-
cally (CBC 1982).
Still, Canada refused to prohibit
a practice that was already ending
through lack of markets. IFAW in-
creased global pressure on the
Canadian government and fishing
industry by launching a boycott of
Canadian seafood products in the
United Kingdom in 1984. The boy-
cott achieved significant corporate
support, and the campaign con-
vinced sealing groups to support a
moratorium on the hunting of
whitecoats. Still, the Canadian
government refused to give in: it
guaranteed to pay sealers 80 per-
cent of the value of the seal pelts
that year (CBC 1984).
Clearly, the offer of subsidies was
not enough. In 1984 and 1985, be-
cause of the European ban on the
import of whitecoat and blueback
sealskins and the successful British
boycott of Canadian fish, there was
no large vessel-based commercial
seal hunt (CBC 1987). Animal pro-
tection groups, confident the
seafood boycott had achieved its
goals, suspended the tactic, believ-
ing the seal hunt was winding down
and would soon be over for good.
In December 1986 the Royal
Commission on Seals and Sealing,
a panel that had been set up by
the federal government two years
earlier, introduced a report in the
House of Commons. Among other
things, the report recommended
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an end to hunting whitecoats. In
1987 large vessel owners prepared
once again to hunt seals. Animal
protection groups reacted quickly,
threatening to move the seafood
boycott into the United States, 
the top market for Canadian
seafood. The Canadian govern-
ment responded by banning the
use of larger vessels and the
killing of newborn pups at the seal
hunt in Canadian waters, effec-
tively ending the large-scale com-
mercial seal hunt for several years
(CBC 1987).
Arguably, this could have been
the end of commercial sealing in
Canada if not for two important
factors—the collapse of the north-
ern cod stock and the rise of the
“wise use” movement, whose
strategies were embraced by those
promoting commercial exploita-
tion of marine mammals.  
The Rise of 
the Wise Use
Movement
Our goal is to destroy, to eradicate
the environmental movement....
We’re mad as hell. We’re not going
to take it anymore. We’re dead
serious—we’re going to destroy
them. We want to be able to ex-
ploit the environment for private
gain, absolutely.
—Ron Arnold, executive vice
president, Center for the Defense
of Free Enterprise (Arnold 1995)
During the second half of the
twentieth century, the environ-
mental movement was fast chang-
ing from a fringe interest into a
politically powerful entity. During
this time leading environmental
organizations such as Greenpeace
were established, and, as public
support for the movement grew,
key environmental defense poli-
cies were successfully adopted.
Three of the most important victo-
ries in the protection of marine
mammals happened during this
time: the 1972 U.S. Marine Mam-
mal Protection Act, the 1982
moratorium on commercial whal-
ing, and the 1983 EU ban on trade
in products of whitecoat and blue-
back seal pups.  
Even as the environmental move-
ment was making headway, power-
ful opponents were surfacing 
in response. Those who stood to
profit from resource exploitation
struck back with an organized force
that became known as the “wise
use” movement. By creating indus-
try front groups, using conserva-
tion language to describe resource
extraction activities, advancing in-
dustry agendas through appropria-
tion of native interests, and pre-
senting environmentalists as self-
interested profiteers, the wise use
movement set  out  to  regain
ground.
In 1988 a conference was organ-
ized by the Center for the Defense
of Free Enterprise (CDFE), led by
an active opponent of the environ-
mental movement, R. Arnold. The
conference drew industry leaders
f rom the  Uni ted  States  and
Canada, and the outcome was a
“wise use agenda” signed by all
participants. But while the objec-
tives of the wise use agenda (in-
cluding clear-cutting of old growth
forests and weakening of endan-
gered species legislation) were
controversial, it was the strategies
laid out by the “wise users” to
achieve their goals that were the
most troubling to environmental
groups. 
One of the key tactics promoted
by the wise use movement to
counter environmental campaigns
was the creation of “front” groups—
industry advocacy organizations
positioned as public interest
groups. Arnold advised,
The public is completely con-
vinced that when you speak as
an industry you are speaking
out of nothing but self-inter-
est... The pro-industry citizen
activist group is the answer to
these problems. It can be an
effective and convincing advo-
cate for your industry. It can
evoke powerful archetypes,
such as the sanctity of the
family, the virtue of the close-
knit community, the natural
wisdom of rural dwellers...and
it can turn the public against
your enemies....I think you’ll
find it one of your wisest in-
vestments over time. (Gold-
berg 2001, 15)
Soon, environmental and animal
protection groups found them-
selves contending with industry-
funded front groups in virtually
every resource-extraction sector
they attempted to influence. It was
in this context that industry and
government-funded sealing advo-
cacy groups, including the North
Atlantic Marine Mammal Commis-
sion (NAMMCO), the World Coun-
cil of Whalers (WCW), the High
North Alliance (HNA), and the
IWMC World Conservation Trust
were established. Notably, the
Canadian government counseled,
participated in, and funded these
organizations (Goldberg 2001).
NAMMCO was created in 1992
by four pro-whaling nations (the
Faroe Islands, Greenland, Iceland,
and Norway) that were dissatisfied
with the International Whaling
Commission’s (IWC) global mora-
torium on commercial whaling.
NAMMCO positions itself as a sci-
ence-based and responsible alter-
native to the IWC and a recognized
international management body.
However, its membership is re-
stricted to whaling and sealing
interests, and experts view it as an
organization working to promote a
wise use agenda (Goldberg 2001).
In 1997 Canada played host to a
NAMMCO meeting, “Sealing the
Future.” The conference, which in-
cluded representatives of the Cana-
dian government, resulted in a
press release demanding the elim-
ination of “WTO incompatible seal
product trade barriers” (North
Atlantic Marine Mammal Commis-
sion 1997, n.p). 
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While NAMMCO positions itself
as an international management
authority, other wise use groups
define themselves as conservation
bodies. On its website (www.iwmc.
org), the IWMC World Conservation
Trust (formerly known as the Inter-
national Wildlife Management Con-
sortium, or IWMC) calls itself a
“global coalition of experts and
wildlife managers promoting the
conservation of habitat and wildlife
resources,” and asks people to
“donate now to protect the world’s
wildlife for future generations.” In
light of this, the public would per-
haps be surprised to learn that
IWMC’s Canadian founder and pres-
ident, E. Lapointe, is a paid lobbyist
for countries seeking to reopen the
trade in endangered species (Vidal
2004). Having previously worked
with the Canadian government for
fourteen years, Lapointe served as
secretary general of the Convention
on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species (CITES) between
1982 and 1990, a position from
which he was dismissed under con-
troversial circumstances when he
campaigned against a ban on the
ivory trade. He later received a set-
tlement after the UN found that his
dismissal was “arbitrary and capri-
cious,” and he now advises several
nations, including Canada, on how
to avoid animal trade legislation
legally (Vidal 2004). Five of the nine
officers in his organization are for-
mer CITES employees, and La-
pointe states that his funding
comes from Canada, China, Japan,
Norway, and "two small European
countries" (Russell 2002).
In addition to advocating trophy
hunts for elephants, reopening the
international ivory trade, and a re-
turn to commercial whaling, the
IWMC strongly supports the Cana-
dian seal hunt. In an open letter
entitled “Seal War,” which was
posted on the IWMC website in
2005, Lapointe urged organiza-
tions to join a “Sustainable Use
Coalition to support the Canadian
Sealers and Fishermen and the
Canadian Government, in their
struggle against the anti-sealing
protest industry” (Lapointe 2005,
n.p.). This, and the other seal con-
tent on the IWMC website, is a
good example of wise use messag-
ing, branding the campaign to
defend the seal hunt as “sustain-
able use” and the campaign to end
it as “eco-terror.” The IWMC site
defines groups working to end the
seal hunt as “extreme,” “radical,”
and “vicious,” and the individuals
who oppose the seal hunt as misin-
formed, wealthy urbanites with lit-
tle understanding of, or concern
for, rural lifestyles. 
Another common wise use strat-
egy emerged in the 1980s: the use
of public sympathy for traditional,
subsistence aboriginal lifestyles to
defend commercia l  t rade  in
wildlife parts. An employee of the
Canadian Department of Indian
and Northern Affairs and senior
Canadian government advisor, 
B. Roberts, explained the tactic at
a whaling conference in Iceland as
he outlined successful strategies
used to counter anti -seal ing
groups. He said,
The first step was to neutral-
ize the appeal of the animal
protection lobby. To accom-
plish this it was necessary to
mount an equally emotionally
powerful counter-appeal. This
counter-appeal was based 
on the survival needs of abo-
riginal communities which de-
pended upon the continued
taking of fur-bearing animals.
(Schmidt 1999, 7)
The Center for the Defense of
Free Enterprise (2006), consid-
ered a leading wise use group, uses
this tactic to support the seal
hunt. The CDFE website includes a
statement that, without providing
any substantiating evidence,
attempts to blame economic hard-
ships and even suicide rates in
native communities on the col-
lapse of the commercial sealing in-
dustry in the 1980s:
The Canadian seal hunt was
decimated by outside intrud-
ers....As a result, the resource-
extracting culture withered
and its suicide rate skyrock-
eted as helpless people felt the
unreasoning hatred of well-fed
constituencies in the domi-
nant urban culture. http://
www.eskimo.com/~rarnold/
seal_hunt.htm.
Notably, the commercial seal
hunt in Canada is conducted
almost entirely by non-aboriginal
people from Canada’s east coast,
and the traditional value of sealing
to native communities has been in
subsistence hunts, which by defini-
tion are not affected by global seal
product trade. According to P.
Hollingsworth, an Ojibwa and
founder of the Native Animal Broth-
erhood, it is resource extraction in-
dustries that are leading to the
demise of native culture. 
He noted,
Indigenous survival is not syn-
onymous with Canada’s fur
trade. Quite the opposite is
true. History has shown that
the commercial fur trade in-
dustry actively promoted the
disintegration of our culture, 
a process which continues 
to this day. (Global Action 
Network n.d). 
Regardless, the perception that
ending the commercial seal hunt
would have a devastating impact
on native communities prevails,
and hardships faced by Canadian
aboriginals remain one of the most
compelling arguments in support
of the hunt. As CDFE’s founder
Arnold stated in 1991, “Facts don’t
matter. In politics, perception is
reality” (Krakauer 1991, 70).  
While these and other wise use
tactics helped seal hunt propo-
nents lay the foundation for a re-
turn to industrial-scale commer-
cial sealing, it was the cod collapse
off the east coast of Canada in the
1990s that provided the political
impetus for the Canadian govern-
ment to act.  
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The Collapse of
Northern Cod
The collapse of the cod stocks was
due to over-fishing. It had nothing to
do with the environment and noth-
ing to do with seals.
—Ransom Myers, former 
Canadian Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans scientist
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s,
Canada’s fishing industry devel-
oped new technologies. With huge
nets, industrial fishing vessels
could haul up as much as two hun-
dred tons of fish in one hour, twice
the amount a typical sixteenth-
century boat would have caught in
an entire season. Cod catches in-
creased steadily over the 1950s
and 1960s, from a yearly average of
250,000 tons to a peak of 800,000
tons in 1968 (Brubaker 2000).
At the time, foreign fishing fleets
were taking the lion’s share of the
fish caught off the east coast of
Canada. They took not only the
cod, but the main food source for
the cod, capelin, as well. It was no
surprise that the northern cod
stock was diminishing under the
double threat of a decreasing food
supply and overfishing (Tsoa
1996).
By 1977 the decrease in ground
fish stocks had become so evident
that Canada imposed a two hun-
dred-mile limit off its coast as a
means of stopping the foreign fish-
ing fleets. Regrettably, instead of
using the new protected zone to re-
duce fishing and allow fish stocks
to rebuild, Canadian fishing com-
panies saw a chance to increase
their own take. In what many envi-
ronmentalists see as a conserva-
tion betrayal, Canadian fishing
fleets dramatically increased the
size of their catches, and in New-
foundland the number of regis-
tered fishers increased by 41 
percent (Blake n.d.). Fisheries biol-
ogist Richard Haedrich elaborated:
“The idea was that the streets were
paved with fish and that now that
the Europeans were gone it would
come to the Canadians” (McK-
ibben 1998, 64). 
Throughout the next decade, the
Canadian government paid little
heed to the concerns of inshore
fishermen who were noticing a
serious decrease in their catches
and the size of the individual
northern cod. They continued to
set unsustainable quotas until it
was evident the northern cod pop-
ulation could withstand no more
(Harris 1998). By the 1990s, with
northern cod stocks at only 1 per-
cent of their historic levels, it was
clear decades of overfishing had re-
sulted in an ecological catastro-
phe. In 1992 a moratorium was
declared on cod fishing; un-
fortunately, by then, many believe
it was already too late (Woodard
2001). 
The public demanded to know
how Department of Fisheries and
Oceans (DFO) scientists could have
missed the obvious signs of a de-
clining population, when inshore
fishermen had been predicting the
collapse for decades. As tens of
thousands of Atlantic Canadians
lost a primary source of income,
the DFO offered up various expla-
nations, from foreign fishing fleets
to changing ocean temperatures.
Despite a consensus among the sci-
entific community to the contrary,
seal predation was at the top of the
DFO’s list (Lavigne 1995). 
Given the residual resentment
surrounding the EU sealskin ban
and the boycott of  Canadian
seafood, the failure of the cod
stocks to recover, and the preva-
lent myth that seals harm fish
stocks, seals were a perfect scape-
goat for dwindling fish stocks. Gov-
ernment and independent scien-
tists argued that only 3 percent of
a harp seal’s diet consists of north-
ern cod, and that harp seals also
consume many significant cod
predators (Lavigne 1995). But
their advice went unheard, and
calls for a seal cull echoed loudly
through eastern Canada and
within the DFO bureaucracy itself. 
A Lethal
Combination
Mr. Speaker, I would like to see the
6 million seals, or whatever num-
ber is out there, killed and sold, or
destroyed and burned. I do not care
what happens to them...the more
they kill the better I will love it.
—John Efford, Newfoundland
Minister of Fisheries 
and Aquaculture, 1998
When the 1992 cod moratorium
was announced, optimistic politi-
cians predicted it would be over
within a few years. But informed
scientists were already stating it
would take at least a decade before
the cod could be expected to recover
(Myers, Mertz, and Fowlow 1997).
As the years went by, it was clear
the cod were not coming back,
and the Canadian government be-
gan to look at ways to appease the
east coast fishing industry. 
In October 1995 B. Tobin, then
Canadian fisheries minister, along
with the fisheries ministers from
Iceland, Norway, Russia, and the
Faroe Islands and a representative
from Greenland, signed a state-
ment declaring seals “a conserva-
tion problem” in parts of the North
Atlantic Ocean (Department of
Fisheries and Oceans 1995, n.p.).
The statement concluded,  “there
is a need to reduce the sizes of the
seal herds...through expanded
commercial harvests where possi-
ble.” Only the EU dissented. 
While informed cynics saw the
move as an attempt to justify com-
mercial sealing and placate fisher-
men in the wake of the cod collapse,
Canadian media provided mislead-
ing legitimacy to the minister’s
statement. The Canadian press
falsely stated that “federal research
has linked seals to a decline in cod
stocks” (Lavigne 1996a, 57). The
Department of Fisheries and
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Oceans’ website homepage at the
time stated, “Harp seals are one of
the factors inhibiting groundfish
recovery” (Lavigne 1995). In reality,
the Canadian government’s own sci-
entists had repeatedly concluded
the depletion of fish stocks had
nothing to do with seals (House 
of Commons Standing Committee 
on Fisheries and Oceans 1997).
Regardless, a public relations foun-
dation was clearly being laid for reju-
venation of the commercial seal
hunt in Canada. It came as little sur-
prise to animal protection groups
when, in 1996, Tobin announced a
massive federal subsidy for sealers
(Lavigne 1996b). Hunt numbers ex-
ceeded 240,000 seals that year and
have remained high ever since. 
The Politics of
Conservation
The following year some clarity was
finally provided on the seals and
cod question when two former DFO
scientists, including J. Hutchings,
published “Is Scientific Inquiry In-
compatible with Government Infor-
mation Control?” (Hutchings, Wal-
ters,  and Haedrich 1997). It
indicated a tradition of suppression
of scientific information at DFO
and cited numerous examples 
of DFO scientists warning that
ground fish stocks were in a dan-
gerous decline; these findings were
either ignored or suppressed as
high quotas continued to be allo-
cated. The authors suggested, “The
conservation of natural resources is
not facilitated by science inte-
grated within a political body”
(Goldberg 2001, 3).
According to the authors, gov-
ernment interference was not re-
stricted to reports on fish stocks.
Just as evidence suggesting a pend-
ing collapse of cod stocks was sup-
pressed, so, too, was information
that did not support the govern-
ment agenda to scapegoat seals;
the authors pointed out that state-
ments in the original draft of the
1995 Stock Status Report on Gulf
of St. Lawrence ground fish, indi-
cating seal predation was unlikely
to be responsible for cod mortality
trends, were allegedly removed
from the published version, con-
trary to scientific advice.
A hearing was convened in the
House of Commons Standing Com-
mittee on Fisheries and Oceans to
hear testimony regarding the re-
port. Witnesses described an estab-
lished pattern at DFO of intimidat-
ing researchers, repressing sci-
entific uncertainty about stock lev-
els, censoring or rewriting reports,
failing to collect or use relevant
data, hiding data from researchers,
barring scientists from speaking to
the media or to colleagues about
their findings, threatening to with-
hold research funding to universi-
ties whose staff criticize DFO, and
threatening to sue DFO critics
(Goldberg 2001, 3). 
R. Myers, a former DFO fisheries
scientist, was called to testify. He
described being tasked by the DFO
bureaucracy to conduct research
“examining the mortality of cod
relating to seals to counter argu-
ments by animal rights people that
one could never detect such an
event.” Myers noted, “We found
out we could not detect the effect
of seals with the data we had.
Because we did not show what was
desired by Ottawa bureaucrats,
that research was suppressed” (in
House of Commons Standing Com-
mittee on Fisheries and Oceans
1997, n.p.). 
Though Myers and other wit-
nesses provided suggestions for
improvements to DFO, the hearing
in the House Standing Committee
on Fisheries and Oceans resulted
in little concrete change at DFO
(Goldberg 2001). A decade later
bottom trawling and other destruc-
tive technologies were still estab-
lished practices in Canada’s fishing
industry (Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation News 2006b), and
seals remained the focus of inten-
sive studies that attempt to link
their populations to declining fish
stocks (Department of Fisheries
and Oceans 2004).   
Trading Quotas
for Votes
In 1997, despite the information
exposed in the House of Commons
inquiry and media, the use of seals
as a scapegoat for fisheries mis-
management continued. New-
foundland’s fisheries minister, J.
Efford, crisscrossed the nation to
convince Canadians of the need for
an expanded seal hunt. “The prob-
lem is that seals eat fish. They do
not eat Kentucky Fried Chicken. I
don’t need to be a genius or a
rocket scientist to figure that out,”
he informed audiences (Luksic
1998, n.p.).
It is perhaps ironic that Efford
was blaming seals for the vanished
cod just as the House of Commons
inquiry was exposing what appeared
to be a DFO agenda to scapegoat
seals for the cod collapse. Around
the same time, F. Mifflin, B. Tobin’s
successor as Canadian fisheries
minister, was telling the public that
the cod stocks were recovering. 
In a 1996 press release, Mifflin
stated, “Declines in stocks have
stopped...there are indications that
some stocks are rebuilding” (De-
partment of Fisheries and Oceans
1996, n.p.). In a controversial move,
just ten days before the 1997 fed-
eral election was called, Mifflin
announced that six thousand tons
of cod could be taken from the
northern Gulf of St. Lawrence and
off the west coast of Newfoundland,
and ten thousand tons could 
be taken from the southern New-
foundland coast (Department of
Fisheries and Oceans 1997).
Meanwhile, attempts by the DFO
to prove seal predation was leading
to increased cod mortality were
falling far short of their goals
(House of Commons Standing
Committee on Fisheries and
Oceans 1997). Nevertheless, a Par-
Canada’s Commercial Seal Hunt 
100 The State of the Animals IV: 2007
liamentary advisory group, the
Fisheries Resource Conservation
Council (FRCC), advised in a 1999
report that the seal herds be re-
duced by up to 50 percent of their
current levels, stating, “action
must be taken immediately to im-
prove opportunities for the conser-
vation and recovery of cod and
other groundfish stocks, without
waiting for absolute scientific proof
of the effects of seal predation”
[emphasis added] (Fisheries Re-
source Conservation Council
1999, 11). 
By 2003 it was clear the contro-
versial new cod fishing zones had to
be closed permanently. The FRCC
distributed a press release calling
for the government to cull seals as a
means to help cod stocks rebuild,
and, in the run-up to another federal
election, fisheries minister R.
Thibault announced the highest
quota for harp seals in history;
Canada would allow nearly one mil-
lion seal pups to be slaughtered over
the next three years (Department of
Fisheries and Oceans 2003). 
The Expanded
Seal Hunt
Last year in the seal management
plan I used a flexible approach....I
introduced a three-year manage-
ment plan of 975,000 seals. It will
mean a reduction for the first time
in the herd.
—R. Thibault, Canadian 
Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans, 2003
With more than one million seals
killed between 2003 and 2006,
Canada’s commercial seal hunt has
become by far the largest slaughter
of marine mammals on Earth. The
2006 kill levels met and even
exceeded those of the 1950s and
1960s, when scientists argued
overhunting threatened the North-
west Atlantic harp seal population.
In The Plundered Seas, M. Berrill
(1997, 120) stated,
Biologists overestimated size
of stocks. Managers proposed
quotas that did not allow for
natural large declines in popu-
lations, and they consistently
set quotas that were higher
than what the biologists pro-
posed. Fishermen lobbied hard
for greater access....
Berrill was referring to the col-
lapse of northern cod in the New-
foundland fishery, but the words
could apply equally to seals today. 
Scientists argue the current Cana-
dian seal hunt management plan
poses a renewed threat to the sur-
vival of seal populations, particularly
in light of the pending effects of cli-
mate change on the habitats of
these ice-dependent animals. They
suggest that DFO’s population mod-
eling may be overestimating harp
seal numbers (Harris, Sousbury, and
Iossa 2005) and note that Canada
and Greenland both hunt the same
population of harp seals but do not
cooperate in setting quotas.
Perhaps these factors would be
less alarming, were it not for the
pending effects of climate change
on harp and hooded seals and other
ice associated animals. In a 2005
report, Johnston et al. (2005) con-
cluded that reduced ice cover in
the Gulf of St. Lawrence and off
Newfoundland and Labrador during
the breeding season may represent
a serious environmental challenge
for harp and hooded seals, which
require an ice platform for whelp-
ing and nursing. The report noted
that, in six of the previous seven
years (1996–2002), ice cover on
the east coast of Canada was signif-
icantly below the seasonal average
for the period 1983–2002, and in
poor ice years, ice cover in some
regions was up to 60 percent less
than the yearly average observed
between 1969 and 2002 (John-
ston et al. 2005). In 1981 and
2002, both poor ice years, Cana-
dian government scientists esti-
mated that three-quarters of the
pups born in the Gulf  of  St.
Lawrence died as a consequence
of bad ice conditions. In 1998 and
2000, they estimated that one-
quarter of the pups died due to lack
of ice before the hunt began (IFAW
2006a).
In 2005 S. Dion, Canada’s envi-
ronment minister, spoke at the
United Nations Climate Change
Conference and warned, “Reduc-
tions in sea ice will drastically
shrink marine habitat for polar
bears, ice-inhabiting seals, and
some seabirds, pushing some
species toward extinction” (Dion
2005, n.p.). The same year, G.
Regan, Canada’s minister of fish-
eries and oceans, allowed sealers to
reach one of the highest quotas for
ice-dependent harp seals in history.
Animal protection groups note
that, in addition to its effects 
on marine mammal populations,
Canada’s commercial seal hunt in-
volves a well-documented and unac-
ceptable level of cruelty. In 2001 an
international team of veterinarians,
including American, British, and
Canadian experts, observed the
commercial seal hunt. The team
studied the seal hunt from the ice
and from the air and performed
postmortems on seal carcasses
abandoned on the ice. Their report
concluded the Canadian commer-
cial seal hunt results in ”consider-
able and unacceptable suffering”
and noted in 42 percent of cases
studied, the seals did not show
enough evidence of cranial injury
to even guarantee unconsciousness
at the time of skinning (Burdon et
al. 2001). 
M. Richardson, a Canadian vet-
erinary expert in humane slaughter
and the former chairwoman of the
Animal Care Review Board for the
Solicitor General of Ontario, con-
tends the seal hunt is inherently
inhumane because of the environ-
ment in which it operates (off-
shore, on unstable ice floes, often
in extreme weather conditions) and
the speed at which it must be con-
ducted to be commercially viable
(hundreds of thousands of animals
are killed over just a few days)
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(Richardson 2005). In 2005 D.
Broom of the University of Cam-
bridge and S. Cheetham, chief vet-
erinary officer of the British Royal
Society for the Prevention of Cru-
elty to Animals (RSPCA), reported
on footage of the Canadian seal
hunt, noting the prolonged suffer-
ing of the animals and the inability
of the sealers to provide an accept-
ably humane death to the pups
(Broom 2005; Cheetham 2005). 
Over six years (2001–2006), virtu-
ally all of the seals killed (97 per-
cent) were less than three months
old, and most were under one
month (Figure 1). The pups in
Canada were killed almost exclu-
sively for their fur. Attempts have
been made over the years to develop
other products, with varying degrees
of success. For a short time in the
mid-1990s, seal organs brought in a
significant percentage of total seal
hunt revenues, though that market
either closed down or was driven
underground in the wake of negative
publicity. The sealing industry has
found some success in marketing
seal oil, but most of it is sold as an
industrial lubricant, and seal-pro-
cessing plant price lists show sales of
seal oil constitute a small amount of
the total income generated by the
seal hunt (Carino Company Limited
2005). Millions of dollars in direct
subsidies were provided to the seal-
ing industry through the late 1990s
to try to develop markets for seal
meat. However, this endeavor failed,
with products such as seal pepper-
oni finding limited acceptance.
Despite the millions of dollars in
government subsidies for product
development and marketing, seal
carcasses are almost always left to
rot on the ice floes, and Canadian
government officials define the com-
mercial seal hunt as “primarily a fur
hunt” (Standing Committee on
Fisheries and Oceans 2006). The
skins are shipped, largely in a raw
(unprocessed) state, directly to
Europe, where they are tanned and
resold in fashion markets. 
Canadian sealers are commercial
fishermen from Canada’s east coast
who participate in several commer-
cial fisheries throughout the year.
Government data show they earn on
average less than 5 percent of their
total annual incomes from sealing.
The rest is from commercial fish-
eries such as crab, shrimp, and lob-
ster (Linzey 2006). This analysis is
supported by quotes from sealers in
media reports (Warne 2004). 
Even in Newfoundland, where
more than 90 percent of sealers live,
sealing income accounts for less
than .1 percent of the gross domes-
tic product. Economists note the
few million dollars the sealing indus-
try brings in each year are offset by
the high level of government sup-
port it receives. As a whole, the seal-
ing industry received more than $20
million in government subsidies
between 1995 and 2001, according
to a report by the Canadian Institute
for Business and the Environment
(Gallon 2001).
In contrast to the relatively mar-
ginal economic contribution it
makes, animal protection groups
argue the commercial seal hunt
causes significant damage to
Canada’s international reputation
and to Canadian businesses. 
The Renewed Fight
to Save Seals
We are absolutely committed to
making sure this is the last slaugh-
ter of baby seals in Canada anyone
will ever have to witness.
—Paul McCartney, March 2006
Throughout the mid- to late 1990s,
animal protection groups around the
world were slowly becoming aware of
the steadily rising seal hunt quotas
in Canada. One after another, organ-
izations launched renewed cam-
paigns—this time to put a “final
end” to the Canadian seal hunt. 
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Source data: Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans harp seal landings reports.
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During those years it became evi-
dent that the animal protection
community had in some ways be-
come a victim of its own success in
the seal campaign. Opinion polls
showed the public was largely
unaware the seal hunt was even
going on (Angus Reid Group
1997), with many believing it had
ended for good in the 1980s. 
Environment and animal protec-
tion organizations argue incomplete
and misleading information provided
by the Canadian government only
helped to confuse the matter.
Though government kill reports
clearly showed most of the seals
killed in the hunt at the time were
pups just days or weeks of age, the
DFO asserted that hunting baby
seals was illegal in Canada, restrict-
ing its definition of “baby seal” to the
newborn (whitecoat) harp seals pro-
tected in Canada from commercial
hunting as of 1987. In Facts about
Seals, the DFO (2000, n.p.) stated,
“Young harp seals are independent
and completely self-reliant two or
three weeks after birth.” Animal pro-
tection groups claimed the DFO
position was misleading and inaccu-
rate. They noted that seals can be
legally hunted in Canada as young as
twelve days old, when they begin to
shed their white fur, and that most of
the seals killed are less than three
months of age. The groups argued
that, at the young age they are
slaughtered, the pups have poorly
developed swimming skills and many
have not yet eaten solid food, leaving
them defenseless against the
hunters. Organizations pointed out
that public opinion polling in 1997
showed 85 percent of Canadians
believed seal pups less than one year
of age should be protected from
hunting (Angus Reid Group 1997).  
Animal protection groups main-
tained that DFO information re-
garding the size of the harp seal
population was equally misleading.
Department publications consis-
tently referred to the harp seal pop-
ulation as being “triple” what it was
in the 1970s, neglecting to mention
that overhunting in the 1950s and
1960s had reduced the population
by as much as two-thirds by the
early 1970s. Animal protection
groups argued that what was in real-
ity a recovery from a dangerously
low level was being misleadingly
represented by the Canadian gov-
ernment as a population explosion. 
Inflations of the economic value
of the seal hunt were persistent in
the DFO messaging. In its 200l
Facts about Seals, the DFO (2001)
claimed, “The seal hunt provides
valuable income to about 12,000
sealers and their families in eastern
Canada.” However, in the same year,
the executive director of the Cana-
dian Sealers Association stated at a
sealing conference,
In Newfoundland, we have
11,000+ licensed sealers with
approximately 2,500 of them
active in any given year. Sealing
licenses are not expensive to
buy—they cost $5.00 a year.
The reason for the large num-
ber of licenses vis-à-vis the
smaller number of active seal-
ers is the fact that if they do not
renew their license in any given
year, they will not be eligible in
the following year. (Greenland
Home Rule 2001, 57)
In Six Facts about Canada’s Seal
Hunt, the DFO (2005b) attributed
a value of $40 million for the Cana-
dian seal hunt, a figure several
times greater than the amount gov-
ernment landings reports show was
actually paid to sealers that year.
The DFO claimed the $40 million
figure was provided by the Cana-
dian Sealers Association (CSA), but
neither the DFO nor the CSA was
able to provide any substantiating
evidence. Regardless, the figure
continued as of late 2006 to appear
prominently on the DFO website. 
As the years progressed, it became
clear that animal and environment
protection groups were opposing
more than the sealing industry in
their campaign to stop the seal
hunt—they were up against the full
force of the Canadian government. 
It was in this challenging environ-
ment that animal protection groups
managed to bring the campaign to
save the seals once again to the fore-
front of the public consciousness. 
Throughout the 1990s organiza-
tions worked on a variety of fronts to
end the seal hunt in Canada. Paid
advertisements educated Canadians
about the humane, conservation,
and economic aspects of the com-
mercial seal hunt. Grass-roots initia-
tives organized by animal protection
groups resulted in protests across
the country, and tens of thousands
of Canadians contacted their politi-
cal representatives to express their
opposition to the seal hunt. Govern-
ment relations campaigns put the
commercial seal hunt onto the
agendas of Canadian politicians.
Scientific studies raised serious
questions about the sustainability of
the Canadian government seal hunt
management plan. 
During this time some advances
were made in the campaign. The
Canadian government reevaluated
some of its estimates of the numbers
of seals actually killed during the
Canadian seal hunt, and the new cal-
culations were incorporated into
management plans. Canada began
to relax its arguably unlawful restric-
tions on seal hunt observers, which
had previously made it very difficult
to obtain footage of the seal hunt.
Possibly in response to opinion polls
showing the majority of Canadians,
including Newfoundlanders, opposed
government subsidies to the seal
hunt (Angus Reid Group 1997),
direct subsidies to sealers were
phased out before 2000. 
However, the Canadian govern-
ment continued to expand the seal-
ing industry, and despite the best
intentions of the animal protection
groups, kill levels continued to
increase...with one notable excep-
tion. In 2000, with the direct meat
subsidy to sealers eliminated, the kill
level dramatically declined, to under
100,000 animals. Animal protection
groups hoped, perhaps naively, that
the hunt was finally beginning to
wind down in favor of less controver-
sial economic opportunities. 
Unfortunately, the reprieve was
brief. Some argue the subsidies were
never really removed but rather
driven underground by negative
publicity. Seal hunt numbers began
to climb again in the following year,
and in 2002 more than 300,000
seals were killed, the highest kill
level in thirty-five years. 
April 2004 marked a turning
point in the campaign, when The
New York Times featured the seal
hunt controversy on its front page
(Krauss 2004). In the weeks that fol-
lowed, major media outlets all over
the globe, including those through-
out Canada, the United States,
Europe, Australia, South America,
and Asia, covered the story. In the
second year of the “million seal
quota,” the world was finally becom-
ing aware that Canada’s seal hunt
was back and twice as large as when
animal protection groups first cam-
paigned to stop it. 
However, rather than working to
end the hunt in the wake of the
negative publicity, the Canadian
government stepped up its defense
and promotion of the sealing indus-
try, allocating the highest quotas
for harp seals in history. Animal
protection groups countered with
a hard-hitting strategy to increase
economic pressure on the Cana-




The message is simple; it will be
heard across the world. If you
oppose Canada’s merciless slaugh-
ter of baby seals, don’t buy Cana-
dian seafood products. 
—Wayne Pacelle, President 
and CEO of The Humane 
Society of the United States, 
press conference, 2005 
In November 2004, in a meeting
between Canada’s Department of
Fisheries and Oceans and animal
protection groups, government offi-
cials said that the only environment
in which the seal hunt could end
would be if Canada’s fishing indus-
try demanded it. This was likely due
to the close ties between the Cana-
dian sealing and fishing industries;
Canadian sealers are commercial
fishermen who hunt seals in the off-
season, and fisheries unions repre-
sent sealers (Fish, Food, and Allied
Workers Union 2001). 
Thus, following decades of unsuc-
cessful negotiations with the Cana-
dian government, a network of some
of the world’s most influential ani-
mal protection groups created an
economic incentive for the Cana-
dian fishing industry to act. Noting
the success of the 1980s seafood
boycott in changing Canadian gov-
ernment policy on the seal hunt, the
network, which represents tens
of millions of people worldwide, de-
clared a boycott of Canadian
seafood products until the seal hunt
is permanently ended (HSUS 2005). 
About two-thirds of Canadian
seafood is exported every year to
the United States, generating
nearly $3 billion for the Canadian
economy annually (Department of
Fisheries and Oceans 2005a). This
made the United States an obvious
initial focus for the campaign to
boycott Canadian seafood. With its
millions of members and con-
stituents across the United States,
The Humane Society of the United
States (HSUS) was in a natural posi-
tion to lead the effort. 
The HSUS launched the seafood
boycott in the United States on
March, 29, 2005, the opening day of
the 2005 commercial seal hunt. As
of mid-2006, The HSUS reported
more than 330,000 Americans and
more than one thousand major
restaurants, grocery stores, and
seafood wholesalers in the United
States pledged not to buy Canadian
seafood until the seal hunt is ended
for good. Since the boycott was
launched, official government trade
statistics through July 2006 showed
the value of Canadian snow crab—a
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Figure 2 
Decline in Value of Canadian Snow
















Source: Canadian international trade data from Statistics Canada through
July 2006 (HS 03.06.14.10).
Total value of Canadian snow crab exports to the United States down 34
percent (CDN$290 million) since the ProtectSeals seafood boycott began.
primary focus of the boycott—ex-
ports to the United States had de-
clined by nearly $300 million (Figure
2). While animal protection groups
have never claimed the boycott is
the only reason for the decline,
they viewed it as a significant fac-
tor (HSUS 2006).
The Canadian government
denied the seafood boycott had
had any impact, blaming the de-
crease in the value of Canadian
snow crab exports to the United
States on market conditions and
competition from other countries.
However, in July 2006 Greenland’s
Grønlandsposten reported the
boycott of Canadian seafood had
directly affected Royal Green-
land’s sales of Canadian seafood in
the United States (AG/Grønland-
sposten 2006). Royal Greenland,
the world’s largest distributor of
cold water shrimp, said its client 
restaurants that formerly bought
Canadian shrimp are now asking
for the more expensive Greenland
variety because of the boycott. 
While the seafood boycott puts
economic pressure on the Cana-
dian government and fishing indus-
try to end the seal hunt, closing the
global markets for seal products is
starting to remove the primary in-




The Assembly undertakes to pro-
mote in every forum regulatory ini-
tiatives aimed at prohibiting the
import and use of seals or seal
parts....The Assembly also asks the
Committee of Ministers and the
parliaments of the Member States
to exert pressure on the Canadian
Government and Parliament to
cease this cruel practice, which is
unbecoming of a civilized nation.
—2004 Motion for 
a Recommendation, 
submitted to the Council of 
Europe by Claudio Azzolini, 
Italian foreign minister
The 1980s European Union Direc-
tive prohibiting the trade in prod-
ucts derived from newborn (white-
coat) harp seals and young
(blueback) hooded seals brought
Canada’s commercial seal hunt to a
virtual standstill for a number of
years (Figure 3). But while the
intent of the legislation was to
decrease demand for products of
seal pups (and thus the incentive
for sealers to hunt them), Canadian
sealers simply began to kill the pups
when they were just a few days older
(Figure 1). Today, the skins of these
young seals are legally traded in
many parts of Europe (Figure 4). 




















































Total Reported Kill of Harp Seals in
the Northwest Atlantic, 1952–2006
Year
Note: Includes Canadian commercial seal hunt and Arctic and Greenland harp seal catches. Catches for Greenland are estimated for 2005 and
2006. Canadian catch for 2006 is preliminary.
Sources: Graph courtesy of S. Fink; data updated from: Stenson (2005). 
As Canada’s commercial seal
hunt once again achieved interna-
tional notoriety in 2004, interna-
tional governments began to act
on behalf of their citizens to put an
end to their trade in all harp and
hooded seal products. Belgium was
the first country to take action,
adopting a legislative proposal in
May 2004 to ban the import/
export and marketing of all seal
products (Fink 2006). Soon other
nations began to act as well; Croa-
tia, Luxembourg, Mexico, and the
Netherlands had all either ended
their trade in seal products or had
initiated campaigns to do so by
2006 (IFAW 2006b). 
Initial Support
from Greenland
On Januar y 5, 2006, footage
obtained by The HSUS of the 2005
commercial seal hunt was broadcast
on Danish and Greenland national
television stations. Public and gov-
ernment reaction was strong and
swift, with Danish animal protection
groups and parliamentarians pub-
licly stating their opposition to
Canada’s commercial seal hunt
(Danish Broadcasting Corporation
2006a). Just twenty-three hours
after the footage was aired, Green-
land Prime Minister H. Enoksen
announced to the Danish and
Greenlandic media that his cabinet
had decided to stop all of the Great
Greenland Company’s trade in
Canadian sealskins (Danish Broad-
casting Corporation 2006b). 
The decision removed an impor-
tant market for Canada’s commer-
cial seal hunt; in 2004 and 2005,
Canadian government trade statis-
tics revealed that Greenland had
imported more than ninety thou-
sand Canadian sealskins. 
The Canadian government and fur
industry reacted strongly. A. Her-
scovici of the Fur Council of Canada
weighed in on the topic in Nunatsiaq
News, sending a clear message to
Greenland. According to Herscovici,
the Greenland government would
“only hurt themselves if they try 
to distance their seal hunting 
from images of clubbed baby seals 
in Atlantic Canada.” He continued,
“[I]f they [animal protection
groups] are successful in stop-
ping the Atlantic Canada hunt,
which they perceive as inhumane,
their next target will be aboriginal
hunters” (in Minogue 2006, n.p.).
On February 3, 2006, a leading
Newfoundland newspaper reported
that several high-level officials with
the Inuit Circumpolar Conference
and the government of Nunavut met
with Greenland officials to present
the “Canadian argument” on the
matter (Baker 2006). On March 24
a high-level delegation from Canada
went to Greenland to discuss trade
opportunities between the two
countries. The delegation included
F. Gregory, Canada’s ambassador to
Denmark; J. Anawak, Canada’s
ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs;
and G. Beaupré, director general of
International Affairs, Fisheries, and
Oceans Canada. While no specific
mention of lobbying against the
sealskin decision was made, the pub-
lished trip itinerary shows meetings
between the senior Canadian dele-
gates and Greenland’s premier and
minister of Fisheries and Hunting
(Greenland Home Rule 2006a).
Within weeks, the Greenland Home
Rule government sent out a media
advisory announcing it would once
again allow Great Greenland to
trade in Canadian sealskins (Green-
land Home Rule 2006b). 
Danish parliamentarians quickly
urged Greenland to reconsider, not-
ing any resumption in trade of Cana-
dian sealskins could severely damage
Greenland’s sealing industry (Green-
land National Broadcasting Company
2006). Denmark’s foreign office then
announced it would investigate the
potential for a Danish ban on trade in
Canadian sealskins. While the Green-
land government had lifted its order
for Great Greenland to stop trading
in Canadian sealskins, as of mid-
2006 it remained uncertain whether
Great Greenland would actually
resume the trade. 
Such a move would likely be met
with strong opposition from the ani-
mal protection community and the
Danish public and government. The
point, however, already may be moot.
Many of the sealskins imported by
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Figure 4 
Canadian Exports of Sealskins 
to Europe, 2004
Source: Eurostat and Statistics Canada.  






Greenland from Canada are reex-
ported into the EU, and the EU was
as of 2006 taking action to stop its
own trade in harp and hooded seal
products. 
The EU Resolves 
to Ban Seal
Products
On September 6, 2006, the Euro-
pean Parliament adopted a written
declaration instructing the Euro-
pean Commission to “immediately
draft a regulation to ban the import,
export, and sale of all harp and
hooded seal products” (Lucas
2006). Four hundred twenty-five
members of the European Parlia-
ment signed the Declaration, the
highest level of support for any reso-
lution in the history of the European
Parliament. While the Canadian
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, L.
Hearn, attempted to dismiss the res-
olution as “really nothing” (Cana-
dian Press 2006a), others were not
so convinced. In a September 7,
2006, press release, Canadian sena-
tor L. Milne, who also serves as pres-
ident of the Canada Europe Parlia-
mentary Association, stated of
Hearn, “If he can’t understand how
important this declaration is, he
doesn’t understand his job” (Liberal
Party of Canada 2006, n.p.). Milne’s
sentiments are perhaps understand-
able. Canadian export statistics indi-
cate the EU is a consistent and sig-
nificant market for unprocessed
(raw) sealskins and other seal prod-
ucts. Moreover, the implications of
an EU prohibition on harp and
hooded seal products are even
greater, given the untracked exports
of tanned sealskins from Canada to
Europe (there is no distinct trade
category for tanned sealskins in
Canada); the powerful fashion mar-
kets in France and Italy; and the
European retail trade of garments
and other finished products made
from sealskin and seal leather. 
A Sealing License
Retirement Plan
We are providing you with an alter-
native to what Paul McCartney
called “a stain on the character of
the Canadian people....” If this is
really simply an economic problem,
then take our offer.
—Cathy Kangas, founder 
and CEO of PRAI Beauty, 
letter to Canadian Prime 
Minister S. Harper, April 2006 
In March 2006 animal protection
groups escorted Paul and Heather
McCartney to the ice floes in the
Gulf of St. Lawrence to be pho-
tographed in the harp seal nursery.
The McCartneys made an impas-
sioned plea to Canadian Prime Min-
ister S. Harper to end the seal hunt
and for the Canadian government
to consider investing in a license
retirement plan for sealers. The
unprecedented media coverage may
have increased hostilities from the
sealing community, with media
reports of violence from sealers
toward seal hunt observers occur-
ring just weeks later (CBC News
2006a). However, the McCartneys’
proposed buyout plan did achieve
some support from both seal hunt
advocates and opponents. 
License retirement programs
have been implemented over the
past few decades in Canada, the
United States, Britain, Europe,
Australia, and elsewhere in the
wake of fishery closures and reduc-
tions (Nautilus Consultants 1997).
The programs can take many forms,
but they generally involve pro-
viding federal funds in exchange
for fishing licenses. This kind of
program has already been put
into practice in Canada for marine
mammal hunts; in the 1970s
Canada declared a moratorium on
commercial whaling and instituted
a buyback program for whaling
licenses (Williams and George n.d.).
In April 2006 BBC News reported
that American businesswoman C.
Kangas had made an offer of $16
million to the Canadian government
to be used for a sealing license re-
tirement program to end the com-
mercial seal hunt. A Department of
Fisheries and Oceans spokesperson
turned down the offer quickly, stat-
ing, “The short answer is no. We’re
not interested in the offer and would
prefer she put the money in another
worthwhile cause” (British Broad-
casting Corporation 2006, n.p.). 
The sealing industry was not as
quick to turn away. On April 15,
2006, the Montreal Gazette repor-
ted that sealers from Prince Edward
Island were open to the concept of 
a buyout (Canadian Press 2006b,
10). K. MacLeod, a local sealer
said, “I talked to quite a few of the
license holders here in P.E.I. and
everyone is willing to give this 
a try.” He concluded that sealers
would like to “explore the alterna-
tives” and observed, “It’s the twenty-
first century.” 
Conclusions
P. Moore, a co-founder of Green-
peace, once said, “What the seal
hunt represented was the para-
mount focus for public attention
on the need to change our basic
attitude and relationship to nature
and to the species that make it up”
(in Herscovici 1998, n.p.). In this
he was correct; for the true cost of
resumption of commercial sealing
is far greater than the seals it
claims each year, and those work-
ing both for and against it are well
aware of what is at stake.
In the wake of the 1990s cod col-
lapse, the Canadian government
clearly felt secure in rejuvenating
the commercial seal hunt, which
had caused so much controversy in
previous decades. Perhaps it be-
lieved that the animal protection
movement had diminished over the
years or that seal hunt proponents
had laid a strong enough public
relations foundation to weather any
opposition. Instead, the Canadian
government soon found itself to be
the focus of strong domestic and
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international criticism for rejuve-
nating the seal hunt. 
Throughout the 1990s seal hunt
proponents spent much of their
efforts either discounting or scorn-
ing efforts by animal protection
organizations to stop the commer-
cial seal hunt. However, more
recently, high-profile celebrities and
hard-hitting campaign tactics by
animal protection groups have
brought the plight of seals in
Canada to the forefront of public
consciousness, creating a backlash
of opposition to the hunt that has
been impossible to ignore. In re-
sponse the Canadian government
has launched a full-scale effort in
defense of commercial sealing inter-
ests, committing the resources of
several federal government depart-
ments. Senior Canadian govern-
ment officials, including the prime
minister, have spoken out regularly
in defense of the sealing industry in
Canada, and Canadian delegations
have lobbied in Europe to prevent
seal product trade restrictions. 
Only time will reveal the fate of
the harp and hooded seals of the
northwest Atlantic, but to seal hunt
opponents, the events of the past
decade could perhaps be summa-
rized by the oft-used words of
Mahatma Gandhi: “First they ignore
you, then they laugh at you, then
they fight you...then you win.”
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